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INTRODUCTION
The common wisdom is that there are twin, related villains in the saga of
the "criminalization of persons with mental illness": the drastic elimination of
psychiatric hospital beds in the 1970s and the 1980s as a result of the "civil
rights revolution;" and the "failure" of the deinstitutionalization movement.'
Both of these explanations are superficially appealing, but neither is correct.
The reduction in state hospital beds - which began in 1954 when the first
generation of antipsychotic drugs such as Thorazine were first made available 2
- was the logical outcome of revelations that state hospital systems were being
overused inappropriately and in ways that consigned tens of thousands of
citizens to the equivalent of lifetime sentences in substandard, dangerous pris-
* Director of the International Mental Disability Law Reform Project and the Online
Mental Disability Law Program; Professor, New York Law School. J.D. 1969, Columbia Law
School; A.B. 1966, Rutgers University. The author wishes to thank Alison Lynch for her excel-
lent research assistance.
1. See generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Past and Future of Deinstitutionaliation litigation, 34
CARDOZo L. REV. 1, 3-12 (2012); Michael L. Perlin, Competeng, Deinstitutionalkation, and Home-
lessness:A Story ofMarginaiZation, 28 Hous. L. Riv. 63 (1991).
2. See, e.g., Jonathan Fish, Overcrowding on the Shs) of Fools: Health Care Reform, Psychiaty, and
the Uncertain Future of Normalit, 11 Hous.J. HEALTH L. & Pot'Y 181, 198-99 (2012); Bernard E.
Harcourt, Reducing Mass Incarceration: Lessons from the DeinstitutionaiZation of Mental Hospitals in the
1960s, 9 OHIo ST.J. CRIm. L. 53, 65 (2011).
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on-like facilitieS3 (characterized by an expert witness, without rebuttal, in dis-
cussing a facility that was at the heart of a famous law reform case, as "Da-
chau, without ovens"). 4 Such facilities often provided little more than custody
and often exacerbated the underlying psychosocial disabilities that led to insti-
tutionalization in the first place.5 The "failures" of deinstitutionalization were
never with the theory of deinstitutionalization, but instead with the political
cowardice of state and federal legislatures in their failures to appropriately
fund and support community living arrangements for persons with mental
disabilities, even those (perhaps, especialy those) with serious psychiatric disa-
bilities.6
At the same time, virtually all valid and reliable behavioral research
taught us that rehabilitation - by any reasonable definition of that term - was
impossible in the large public institutions that are so nostalgically referenced
in so much of the "bring back the good old days" literature.7 Beyond this,
over a decade ago, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Olmstead v. LC 8
ruled that the Americans with Disabilities Act mandated that patients had a
right to treatment in an integrated community setting as opposed to an unnec-
essarily segregated state hospital, stressing that "[u]njustified isolation . . . is
properly regarded as discrimination based on disability."9
But this is nothing new to those of us who have spent our careers think-
ing about these issues. And the fact remains that, in spite of all the research,
the litigation, the advocacy, and the public interest, the percentage of persons
with mental illness in jails and prisons appears to be increasing dramatically'o
3. See generally Michael L. Perlin, 'Abandoned Love": The Impact of Watt v. Stickney on the
Intersection Between International Human Rights and Domestic Mental Disability Iaw, 35 L. & PsYCHOL.
RFv. 121 (2011).
4. LFOPOLD LIPPMAN & 1. 1GNANCY GOLDBERG, THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION: ANATOMY
OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CASE AND ITS IMPLICATION FOR ExcEPTIONA. CHII.DREN 17 (1973),
quoted in Perlin, supra note 1, at 100 n. 215. The reference was to the Pennhurst State School in
suburban Philadelphia, PA. Seegenerall Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1
(1981).
5. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 327 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (urging
adoption of a "non-deterioration" standard (that an individual committed to a facility for per-
sons with mental disabilities is entitled to "such training as is reasonably necessary to prevent a
person's pre-existing self-care skills from deteriorating because of his commitment")). On how
this concurrence has been expanded upon in subsequent institutional rights litigation, see 2
MICHAELL.PERIN,MENTAi.DISABII.ITY LAW: CIVILAND CRIMINAL, at 111-17 (2d ed. 1999).
6. See Perlin, supra note 1, at 94-96.
7. See, e.g., Joanmarie Ilaria Davoli, No Room at the Inn: How the Federal Medicaid Program
Created Inequities in Prychiatric Hospital Access for the Indigent Mental# Il, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 159,
180 (2003) ("The failure of deinstitutionalization to improve treatment for the mentally ill is
reminiscent of the failure of state-run psychiatric institutions to deliver humane, effective
treatment and care over an extended period of time.").
8. 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
9. Id. at 582, 597.
10. We know virtually nothing about the percentages in the 1940s and 1950s; to the best
of my knowledge, there is no data available on that question.
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for reasons somehow related to deinstitutionalization and the enforcement of
the civil rights of patients. It is a truism that (depending on where you live)
Rikers Island or the Cook County House of Detention or the Los Angeles
County jail is the "largest mental health facility in the nation."" Data tells us
that there are three times as many individuals incarcerated in prison as institu-
tionalized in mental hospitals and it is estimated that, in the United States,
14.5% of male adults in prisons and jails have a mental illness, as do 31% of
female adultS12 - a rate of two to four times that of the general population.13
And, importantly, prisoners with mental illness are more likely to violate
prison rules leading to disciplinary hearings, inappropriate sanctions, and seg-
regation.14 It is clear that something has happened (and continues to happen),
but I am not convinced at all that the common wisdom about it is anywhere
nearly accurate.
The questions that I wish to address today are these: What are we miss-
ing, and what, if anything, can/should we do? But first, let me offer an idea to
which we have failed to pay any attention in this context and suggest that it
may be a major "hidden culprit" in this entire discussion. An idea that is based
significantly on my own professional background, from the thirteen years that
I was a "real lawyer" before I became a professor. I spent three years as a
Deputy Public Defender in Trenton, New Jersey, and eight years as director
of the New Jersey Division of Mental Health Advocacy (this was between
1971 and 1982 - not an unimportant factor in this story). A significant portion
of my caseload involved the representation of persons with mental illness who
had been charged with crime, often with serious crime.
11. See, e.g., Gregory L. Acquaviva, Mental Health Courts: No Longer Experimental, 36 Sl;TON
HALII L. Riv. 971, 978 (2006) (observing that, "in 1992, the Los Angeles County jail became
the nation's largest mental institution, with Cook County Jail, Illinois, and Riker's Island, New
York, as second and third respectively."). Judges concur with this finding. SeeJudge Stephen S.
Goss, Mental Health Court Programs in Rural and NonaffluentJurisdictions, 33 CRIM. JUST. Ri v. 405,
405 (2008) ("Our jails have become the de facto mental health treatment centers for many
persons.").
12. Henry Steadman et al., Prevalence of Serious Mental Illness Among jail Inmates, 60
PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 761, 761 (2009). On the strong causal relationship between incarceration
and major depressive disorder and bipolar disorder, see Jason Schnittker et al., Out and Down:
Incarceration and Psychiatric Disorders, 53 J. HHAI.TH & Soc'i. BEHAV. 448 (2012).
13. See generally Jamie Fellner, A Corrections .Quandary: Mental Illness and Prison Rules, 41
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Riw. 391 (2006); Christina Canales, Prisons: The New Mental Health .Sjstem, 44
CONN. L. REv. 1725 (2012); William Narrow et al., Revised Prevalence ofEstimates ofMental Disor
ders in the United States, 59 ARCH. Gi;N. PSYCHIATRY 115 (2002).
14. Fellner, supra note 13, at 395-96. See also Henry Steadman, Foreword to RISOoN N.
SLATE & W. WSI BY JOHNSON, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF THE MENTAILY ILL: CRISIS AND
OPPORTUNITY FOR THE JUSTICE SYSTEM xiii (2008) (rates of major depression of male jail and
prison inmates are four times that of the general population, and of female inmates, ten times;
rates are ten times higher for incidences of bipolar disorders).
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I have recounted elsewhere the story of how, soon after the U.S. Su-
preme Court decided Jackson v. Indiana (thus "creating" modern mental health
law),15 I filed a class action suit in New Jersey, Dixon v. Cahill, to implement
Jackson (when I was but a rookie Public Defender), resulting in a court ruling
that the indefinite incarceration of individuals in the Vroom Building - New
Jersey's "maximum security facility for the criminally insane"' 6 - violated Jack-
son and that each institutionalized individual had a right to an individual hear-
ing. "This was in 1973, and we quickly discovered cases of individuals who
had been awaiting trial since 1963, 1953, 1948, and, in one case, 1928," and,
when the dust settled, "the courts ultimately found that 185 of our 225 clients
had been illegally detained." 7 The international publicity that flowed from this
case led to the creation of the Division of Mental Health Advocacy in the
New Jersey Department of the Public Advocate, and regularized the represen-
tation of persons being civilly committed against their will and those seeking
release from institutionalization. This was all, of course, part and parcel of the
mental health advocacy "movement" of the 1970s, an outgrowth of the great-
er turn to "public interest law" at this time in our nation's legal history.i8
But, a series of developments in the 1980s changed the contours of this
legal landscape, reflecting some "disenchantment on the part of the public ...
and . .. federal courts with the notion of vastly expanding the civil rights and
civil liberties of persons with mental disabilities." 9 Subsequently, in that nu-
merically-small, but well-publicized (often over-publicized) universe of cases
in which persons with serious mental disabilities are charged with serious
crimes, 20 raising mental status defenses - never a great option for a criminal
defense lawyer - became a much riskier and potentially-catastrophic option.21
Although there has been a robust literature on the meaning and significance
of these changes in criminal procedure, to the best of my knowledge, no one
15. 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) ("At the least, due process requires that the nature and dura-
tion of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is
committed. [A] person charged by a State with a criminal offense who is committed solely on
account of his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period of
time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain that
capacity in the foreseeable future."). See Michael L. Perlin, 'Justice's Beautiful Face": Bob Sadoffand
the Redemptive Promise of TherapeuticJurirprudence, 40 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 265, 278 n. 2 (2012) (dis-
cussing Jackson's impact).
16. See Michael L. Perlin, 'T-laf-Wracked Prejudice Leaped Forth": Sanism, Pretextuality, and Why
and How Mental Disability Law Developed as It Did, 10J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUEs 3, 7 (1999).
17. Michael L. Perlin, "May You Stay Forever Young": Robert Sadoff and the History of Mental
Health Law, 33 J. AMER. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 236, 237 (2005).
18. See 2 PERLIN, supra note 5, at 6-20 (discussing reasons for the expansion at this point in
time of the rights of persons institutionalized because of mental disabilities).
19. Id. at 22.
20. See, e.g., Joanmarie Ilaria Davoli, Physical# Present, Yet Mental# Absent, 48 U. Lou isvitu
L. Riv. 313, 315 (2009).
21. See generally MICHAEL L. PERIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 1
(1994).
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yet has considered them in the context of the issue addressed in this paper -
the criminalization of persons with mental illness. This will be a focus of my
paper.
First, in Part I, I will address the "common wisdom" explanations, and
explain why I find them wanting. Next, in Part II, I will consider the relevant
major changes in criminal procedure over the past thirty years that have con-
tributed significantly to the problems we face. Some of these changes include:
(1) the narrowing of the insanity defense, (2) the constitutional sanctioning of
lengths of commitment for insanity acquittees that are far longer than the
maximum sentences for the underlying charged offenses, (3) Supreme Court
decisions making it less likely that jurors will accept the insanity defense, (4)
the extended sentences faced by defendants who unsuccessfully raise the in-
sanity defense, (5) the enlarged use of involuntary antipsychotic medication in
efforts to make incompetent defendants competent to stand trial, and (6) the
failure of most states to comply with the now-forty-year-old mandate of Jack-
son v. Indiana. In Part III, I will look at the potential use of therapeutic juris-
prudence as a tool to deal with the current state of affairs. In Part IV, I will
conclude with some policy recommendations in an effort to remediate the
current problems, including the need to train lawyers on the issues I discuss in
this paper and the role of mental health courts as a potentially ameliorating
partial-solution.
My title comes from Bob Dylan's song, Political World, a song that he,
alas, has not sung since February 1991.22 The lyric comes from this couplet:
We live in a political world
Wisdom is thrown into jail
It rots in a cell, is misguided as hell
Leaving no one to pick up a trail23
Over a decade ago, I concluded that this line "captured the entire insani-
ty defense debate." 24 The "worldview" of Political World is "dangerous and
suspicious," filled with "anxiety and despair," and warns of "spiritual death." 25
It is, in the words of one critic, "Bob's commentary on the state of the fallen
22. See generaly, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, "Life Is In Mirrors, Death Disappears". Giving life to
Atkins, 33 N. Mrx. L. Risv. 315 (2003) [hereinafter Perlin, Death Disappead; Michael L. Perlin,
Myths, Realities, and the Pobtical World:I The Anthropology of Insanity Defense Attitudes, 24 BuIl.1. Am.
AcAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 5 (1996); Michael L. Perlin, "Big Ideas, Images and Distorted Facts": The
Insanty Defense, Genetics, and the Political World, in GlNIETICS AND CRIMINALIlTY: THE POTNTIAL.
MisusI; OF SCIISNTIFIC INFORMATION IN COURT 37 (Jeffrey R. Botkin et al. eds., 1999) [herein-
after Perlin, Big Ideas]. I discuss the Oh Mercy! album (of which Political World is the opening
track) in Michael L. Perlin, Blood on the Cup, 1 MONTAGUE STRET 13 (2009).
23. Bob Dylan, Political World, on OH MIERCY (Sony Music Entertainment Inc. 1989).
24. Perlin, Big Ideas, supra note 22, at 39.
25. OI.IvIHR TRAGHR, KiEYS TO THHS RAIN: THi; DEFINITvi; BOB DYLAN ENCYCILOPHDIA
493 (2004).
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world we live in." 26 I have characterized it elsewhere as "pretty existential." 27
By continuing to mouth banal platitudes about the alleged villains in the sce-
nario that we are discussing today, we continue to throw wisdom, along with
uncounted persons with mental disabilities into jail.
I. THE COMMON WISDOM
Over twenty years ago, I summarized the common wisdom about dein-
stitutionalization in the following way, and little has happened in the interven-
ing years to lead me to change what I then said:
The story goes something like this: nurtured by radical psychi-
atrists (such as Thomas Szasz and R.D. Laing), spurred on by
politically-activist organizations pushing egalitarian social
agendas (such as the ACLU), a cadre of brilliant but diabolical
patients' rights lawyers dazzled sympathetic and out-of-touch
judges with their legal legerdemain - abetted by wooly-headed
social theories, inapposite constitutional arguments, some oh-
my-god worst-case anecdotes about institutional conditions,
and a smattering of "heartwarming successful [deinstitutional-
ization] cases"- as a result of which courts entered orders
"emptying out the mental institutions" so that patients could
"die with their rights on." When cynical bureaucrats read the
judicial handwriting on the hospital walls, they then joined the
stampede, and the hospitals were thus emptied. Ergo deinsti-
tutionalization. Ergo homelessness. Endgame. 28
I said then that that story was "all wrong. Dead wrong. Obscenely
wrong."29 And, in spite of a tsunami of polemic seeking to rectify the position
that I reject, I still believe, perhaps more strongly than ever, that the story,
indeed, is wrong.30 I cast my lot here with Professor Sam Bagenstos who ar-
gues, persuasively, that "deinstitutionalization has been a success in many
significant respects," 31 pointing out how many facilities - including the one
26. See Perlin, Death Disappears, supra note 22, at 316.
27. Michael L. Perlin, Tangled Up In Law: The jurisprudence of Bob Dylan, 38 FORD. URB. L.J.
1395, 1408 (2011).
28. Michael L. Perlin, Book Review, 8 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 557, 559 - 60 (1991)
(reviewing ANN BRADEN JOHNSON, OUT OF BEDLAM: THE TRUTH ABOUT
DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION (1990)).
29. Id. at 560.
30. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 609 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). "A leading critic,
Dr. E. Fuller Torrey, described its results as 'a psychiatric Titanic' - an evocative phrase quoted
with approval by two Supreme Court justices - and as 'one of the great social disasters of re-
cent American history."' Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 2 (quoting E. FULLER TORREY, OUT OF THE
SHADOWS: CONFRONTING AMERICA'S MENTAL ILLNESS CRISIS 11 (1997)). See also Robert Weis-
berg, Restorativejustice and the Danger of "Community," 2003 UTAH L. Riv. 343, 364 (2003) ("It is
now an axiom that deinstitutionalization caused the contemporary epidemic of homelessness
for the mentally ill.").
31. Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 7. See also id. at 50:
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described as "Dachau without ovens" 32 - had been closed in the aftermath of
the early wave of patients' rights litigation. He adds:
To be sure, we could solve the problem of homelessness
among people with psychiatric disabilities by simply institu-
tionalizing them for the long term. But other policies could
solve that problem just as well--notably supportive housing, in
which individuals obtain tenancy in apartments linked with
supportive services. And yet, as homelessness was increasing
in the 1980s, the federal and state governments were cutting
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and housing assistance--
the very programs that could pay for community-based hous-
ing for people with psychiatric disabilities. The indictment of
deinstitutionalization, as opposed to the failure to invest in
community-based services and supports, does not rest on an
empirical determination of what happened in the world so
much as on a normative premise that institutionalization is
preferable to community-based housing and supports. Given
the undoubted harms of long-term institutionalization for
people with psychiatric disabilities, and the viability of evi-
dence-based community services ... there is no good reason
to prefer institutionalization as the solution to the homeless-
ness problem among people with psychiatric disabilities.33
But deinstitutionalization is seen as the villain and criminalization as the
inevitable by-product.34 Never mind that there is empirical evidence that, in
I hope I have shown that the past of deinstitutionalization litigation was, in key re-
spects, far more successful than most observers acknowledge. The limits of that suc-
cess were very real, though: although deinstitutionalization advocates succeeded in clos-
ing the front doors of large state institutions so that few new people with developmen-
tal or psychiatric disabilities came in, and in opening the back doors of those institu-
tions so that the vast majority of long-term residents moved out, they were less suc-
cessful in building a comprehensive system of adequate and appropriate services in the
community. That key failure stemmed, I have argued, from two factors: limitations in
the legal-doctrinal tools on which deinstitutionalization advocates relied; and a political
alignment that created pressures to close institutions without building the community-
based services that would be necessary to replace them.
Id.
32. See generally, e.g., Pennhurst State School & Hospital, 451 U.S. 1 (a case involving the condi-
tions at a state institution for the mentally ill, which has been described by commentators as
"Dachau, without ovens." L. LIPPMANN & I. GoiDBERG, THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION:
ANATOMY OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CASE AND ITS IMPLICATION FOR EXCHPTIONAI CHILDREN
17 (1973)).
33. Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 11-12. See also, SIATU &JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 27-28.
34. On how this is a "crude explanation," see Betsy Ginsberg, Out with the New, In with the
Old: The Importance of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act to Prisoners with Disabiliies, 36 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 713, 719 n. 24 (2009). For a careful analysis of the shortcomings of this explanation,
see William H. Fisher, Eric Silver, & Nancy Wolff, Beyond Crimina#!Zation: Toward a Criminologicaly
Informed Framework for Mental Health Polcy and Services Research, 33 ADMIN. & Pot'Y MENTAL
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the aftermath of litigation, protective measures (such as a statewide "crisis
system") can be put in place to minimize the "likelihood that released patients
would become involved in criminal behavior." 35 Never mind that "the causal
link between deinstitutionalization and criminalization has never been rigor-
ously tested." 36 Never mind that there is substantial valid and reliable empiri-
cal evidence that the successful training of police officers (the so-called
"Memphis plan") reduces subsequent criminal behavior and arrests in the
population in question,37-an option made even more urgent in light of the
findings of Professor Linda Teplin that the "likelihood of arrest of persons
exhibiting signs and symptoms of mental illness [is] 67% greater [than that] of
those who did 'not appear to be mentally fil."38 Never mind that "while the
proportion of [persons with serious mental illness] in psychiatric institutions
fell by 23 percent, the percentage of incarcerated [persons with serious mental
illness] increased only 4 percent in the last half of the last century." 39 Never
mind that many persons with mental illness are brought to jails rather than
HEALTH & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. REs. 544, 549 (2006) (calling for a "criminologically-
informed mental health services and policy perspective").
35. See Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 34 (discussing Settlement Agreement, United States v.
Virginia, Civil Action No. 3:12-CV-059 (E.D. Va. Jan. 26, 2012) (The "agreement contains
detailed provisions for a statewide crisis system for people with intellectual and developmental
disabilities, so that the response to a behavioral or other crisis is not institutionalization or
criminalization but instead is an intervention that ensures that the individual can remain suc-
cessfully in the community.")).
36. Arthur J. Lurigio, Examining Prevailing Beliefs about People nith Serious Mental Illness in the
Criminaljustice System, 75 FiD. PROBATION 11, 12 (2011).
37. See MICHAEL L. PERLIN & HENRY A. DLUGACZ, MENTAL HEALTH ISSUES IN JAILS AND
PRISONs 31-36 (2006); Deborah Calloway, Using Mindfulness Practice to Work dith Emotions, 10
NEv. L.J. 338, 359 n. 77 (2010) (Memphis has a program that "has resulted in reduced injuries
and arrests and increased diversion of mentally ill individuals into treatment programs."). Com-
pare Henry J. Steadman, Martha Williams Deane, Randy Borum, & Joseph P. Morrissey, Compar-
ing Outcomes of Major Models of Police Responses to Mental Health Emergencies, 51 PSYCHIATRIC SERvS.
645, 649 (2000) (In jurisdictions that have adopted a Memphis-type approach, the arrest rate is
7% in cases involving police encounters with persons with mental illness), with Gordon Strauss
et al., Pychiatic Disposition of Patients Brought in by Crisis Intervention Team Police Officers, 41 COMM.
MENT. HIEALTH J. 223, 224 (2005) (in other jurisdictions, the estimated arrest rate is 20%). See
SLATE & JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 99-100; H. Richard Lamb et al., Mentally 11 Persons in the
CriminalJustice System: Some Perspectives, 75 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 107, 116 (2004).
38. Linda A. Teplin, Keeping the Peace: Poce Discretion and Mental II Persons, NAT'L INST.
JUST. J. (July 2000), at 8, 12, available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/jr000244c.pdf, as
discussed in SLATE & JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 88. See Peter C. Patch & Bruce A. Arrigo,
Police Officer Attitudes and Use of Discretion in Situations Involving the Mentally III, 22 INT'L. J.L. &
PSYCHIATRY 23, 28 (1999) ("In fact, the vast majority of police departments do not provide
clear guidelines for interacting with the mentally ill at all.").
39. Lurigio, supra note 36, at 13 (generally citing RICHARD FRANK & SHERRY GinD,
MENTAL HEALTH POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1950: BErER BUT NOT WEILL 1
(2006)).
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mental hospitals in the first place(I because of how much more time-consuming
mental hospital "drop offs" are and for a variety of other reasons. 41 Never
mind that the evidence is crystal-clear that "people with mental illness 'engage
in offending and other forms of deviant behavior not because they have a
mental disorder but because they are poor,"' 42 and that the strongest risk fac-
tors for violence "are shared by those with and without mental illness." 43
Never mind that "we know little about the true prevalence of mental illness
among offenders throughout all stages of the criminal justice system, or about
the extent to which the needs of mentally ill offenders are going unmet."44
Never mind that there is similarly substantial valid and reliable evidence that,
if proper screening and placement procedures are employed, every resident of a
large inpatient facility could be successfully placed in community settings.45
40. These are sometimes referred to as "mercy bookings." See Canales, supra note 13, at
1736 (citing e.g., H. Richard Lamb et al., The Police and Mental Health, 53 PSYCHIATRIC SFIRvs.
1266, 1267 (2002)).
41. These reasons relate to the work conditions of the police officers involved and to what
is perceived as the lack of "supportiveness" of the relevant mental health facilities; and a lack of
coordination between the police and mental health professionals, rather than to the acts or the
clinical conditions of the apprehended individuals. SLATF & JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 87-89
(citing, for example, Randy Borum et al., Police Perspectives on Responding to Mentally Ill People In
Crisis: Perceptions of Prgram Efectiveness, 16 BEHAv. SCI. & L. 393 (1998)). See general# Randy
Borum et al., Substance Abuse, Violent Behaviors and Police Encounters among Persons with Severe Mental
Disorder, 13 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 236 (1997) [hereinafter Borum et al., Poce Encounters];
Virginia G. Cooper et al., Dispositional Decisions with the Mentally Ill Police Perceptions and Characteris-
tics, 7 PoLiC Q. 295 (2004); J.R. Husted et al., Cahfornia Law Enforcement Agencies and the Mentally
111Offender, 23 Buii.. Am. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 315 (1995). See also, Lamb et al., supra note 37.
On how police departments' organizational structures need to be changed so as to
better optimize such coordination, see Robert Panzarella & Justin Alicea, Police Tactics in Incidents
with Mentally. Disturbed Persons, 20 POLICING: INT'L. J. POLICli STRATEGY & MGMT. 326, 337
(1997). On the need for enhanced collaboration, see Lamb et al., supra note 40. Encouragingly,
in one study, over 90% of police officers reported that they felt mental health training was
either fairly or very important. See Marilyn Price, Commentary: The Challenge of Training Police Offic-
ers, 33 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 50, 50 (2005) (discussing findings reported in Heidi S.
Vermette et al., Mental Health Training for Law Enforcement Professionals, 33 J. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 42 (2005)).
42. Jennifer L. Skeem et al., Correctional Poliy for Offenders with Mental Illness: Creating a New
Paradigm for Recidivism Reduction, 35 L. & Hum. BlIHAv. 110, 116 (2011) (quoting Fisher, Silver, &
Wolff, supra note 34, at 553).
43. Skeem et al., supra note 42, at 117 (generally citing inter alia JOHN MONAHAN, RISK
Assi;ssMI;NT: VIOi.ENCE AND MENTAL DIsORDER 1 (2001) and Elizabeth Walsh et al., Violence
and Schirophrenia: Examining the Evidence, 180 BRIT.J. PSYCHIATRY 490 (2002)).
44. Daniel P. Mears, Mental Health Needs and Services in the Criminal justice System, 4 Hous. J.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 255, 257-58 (2004). On the need for enhanced mental health services after
arrest, see Lamb et al., supra note 37, at 116-17.
45. James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 Grio.
WASH. L. Riv. 414, 476 n. 351 (1985) (generally citing JAMES W. CONROY & VALERIF, J.
BRADLEY, PENNHURST LONGITUDINAL STUDY: A REPORT OF FivE YEARS OF Ri;SlARCH AND
ANALYSIS 1 (Temple University & Human Services Research Institute 1985) ("finding that all
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Never mind that we have not even begun to do serious research into, by way
of example, the specific issues that relate to the status of elderly persons with
mental disabilities in the criminal justice system. 46 Never mind the staggering
fiscal costs of the current state of affairs. 47 And never mind, most importantly
of all, that "[t]here is no evidence for the basic criminalization premise that
decreased psychiatric services explain the disproportionate risk of incarcera-
tion for individuals with mental illness,"48 that "there is little evidence that the
risk of incarceration has uniquely increased for those with mental illness," 49
and that "no research exists demonstrating that mental illness is a principal or
proximate cause of criminal behavior for most offenders with mental illness-
es." 50
John Junginger and his colleagues state the valid and reliable research
simply and precisely:
Unless it can be shown that factors unique to serious mental
illness are specifically associated with behavior leading to ar-
rest and incarceration, the criminalization hypothesis should
be reconsidered in favor of more powerful risk factors for
crime than are inherent in social settings occupied by persons
with severe mental illness - risk factors such as unemploy-
ment, poverty, homelessness, and substance abuse.51
Pennhurst residents, regardless of level of [mental disability], could be served successfully in the
community")).
46. See generally, e.g., Tina Maschi et al., Ain, Mental Health, and the Criminaljustice .Sstem: A
Content Analysis of the Literature, 2 J. FORENS. SOCIAL WORK 162 (2012).
47. See Thomas L. Hafemeister, Sharon G. Garner & Veronica E. Bath, Forging links and
Renewing Ties: App ing the Princples of Restorative and Procedural Justice to Better Respond to Criminal
Offenders nith a Mental Disorder, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 147, 221 n. 343 (2012). Contrarily, state spend-
ing for treatment of persons with serious mental illness is estimated to be one-third less now
than it was in the 1950s. From Prisons to Hospitals - And Back: The Criminaliation of Mental Illness,
PRISON POL'Y INITIATIVE, www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/menbrief.htmi (last visited Apr. 1,
2013).
48. Skeem et al., supra note 42, at 116. See also John Junginger et al., Efects of Serious Mental
Illness and Substance Abuse on Criminal Offenses, 57 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 879, 879 (2006) [hereinaf-
ter Junginger I] (citing John Junginger et al., Psychotic Motivations and the Paradox of Current Research
on Serious MentalIllness and Violence, 30 SCHIZOPHRENIA Bui.. 21 (2004), stating that "[iln fact,
what little empirical research exists on this particular interpretation of the criminalization hy-
pothesis has produced no consensus."). See also Fisher, Silver, & Wolff, supra note 34, at 548
("empirical support for the 'standard' criminalization argument as a base from which to con-
struct policy or research agendas appears weak at best.").
49. Skeem et al., supra note 42, at 116 (citing inter alia, FRANK & GI.IFD, supra note 39, at
128 ("[I]t would be a mistake to attribute the increase in ... incarceration among people with
SPMI directly to the experience of deinstitutionalization.")).
50. E. Lea Johnston, Theoriging Mental Health Courts, 89 WASH. U. L. REv. 519, 565 (2012)
(citing Nancy Wolff, Courting the Court: Courts as Agents for Treatment andJustice, in COMMUNITY-
BASED INTERVENTIONS FOR CRIMINAL OFFENDERS WITH SEVERE MENTAL ILILNESS 143, 155,
163 (William H. Fisher ed., 2003)).
51. Junginger I, snpra note 48, at 882. See also Ginger Lerner Wren, Mental Health Courts:
Servingjustice and Promoting Recovery, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 577,581 (2010):
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The "villainry" story - abetted by the pernicious use by the media and
unscrupulous politicians of the vividness heuristic 52 - still captures the public
debate (and to some extent, the scholarly debate), but it is one that must be
flatly rejected.53
II. CHANGES IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
As I indicated in the Introduction, the past thirty years have seen a clus-
ter of changes to criminal procedure (via statute and judicial decisions, both
leading to changes in practice), that, in the aggregate, make the use of an in-
sanity defense or the raising of a mental status issue a much less attractive
option to the defendant than ever before. I will look at each of these separate-
ly:
A. The Shrinking of the Insanity Defense
1. Substantive and Procedural Limitations
We can logically look at March 30, 1981 - the day that John Hinckley
shot Ronald Reagan - as the turning point in this area of the law. In my book-
length treatment of the insanity defense, I even tided a sub-chapter "Reagan
as Hinckley's victim; Hinckley as Reagan's victim"54 so as to reflect this turn
of events. "Post-Hinckley outrage served as a catalyst for public denunciation,
which led to speedy legislative inquiry, 'reform' legislation, and ultimately, to a
The consequences of untreated mental illness and the resulting criminalization of the
mentally ill can be attributed to a number of factors, including: severely underfunded
community based systems of care, lack of adequate housing and the prevalence of
homelessness, and the overall lack of specialized forensic services and supports for
those reentering the community. Further, the increased use of illicit substances in the
general population and among the mentally ill has likely made a significant contribution
to an increase in all types of offenses.
On the relationship between the risk factors of substance abuse and medication noncompli-
ance, see Borum et al., Police Encounters, supra note 41.
52. See Michael L. Perlin, 'Tbe Borderne Which Separated You From Me": The Insanity Defense,
the Authoritaian Sirit, the Fear of Faking, and the Culture of Punishment, 82 IowA L. Riv. 1375, 1417
(1997) (defining vividness heuristic as "a cognitive-simplifying device through which a 'single
vivid, memorable case overwhelms mountains of abstract, colorless data upon which rational
choices should be made"'). On the role of the media and of politicians in this context, see
Perlin, supra note 1, at 110-11 nn. 272-76.
53. This is not to say that there are not many people with psychosocial disabilities in jails
and prisons, and it in no way ignores the sobering statistics referred to earlier. Seegenerall, e.g.,
Fellner, supra note 13; Canales, supra note 13. Rather, it suggests that the blame is misplaced in
ways that make it less likely that we will turn to ameliorative action in an effort to remediate the
problems at hand. See SIATiF &JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 28-29.
54. See PERIN, supra note 21, at 333-48.
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'shrinkage' of the insanity defense."55 There is no question that the Hinckley
acquittal "helped legitimize long-standing efforts at both the state and federal
levels to abolish or reform the defense,"5 6 and that those efforts were, by and
large, successful.
This shrinkage involved three components: (1) restrictions on the limits
of the substantive test (in this case, the elimination of the so-called "volition-
al" prong in the federal Act),57 (2) alterations in the procedural aspects of the
insanity plea (in this case, both the shifting of the burden of proof to the de-
fendant, and changing the quantum of evidence necessary to sustain a plea);58
and (3) increased restrictions on insanity acquittees following their post-
acquittal commitment to psychiatric institutions.59
In the wake of the Reagan shooting, twenty-six different pieces of legis-
lation were soon introduced into Congress to abolish or limit the insanity
defense. 60 The bill that was ultimately enacted as the Insanity Defense Reform
Act of 1984 ("IDRA") had the effect of 'returning the insanity defense in
federal jurisdictions to status quo ante 1843: the year of . .. [the] M'Naghten
[casel.' 61 Fundamentally, the bill that was ultimately enacted changed the law
in four material ways: 1) it shifted the burden of proof to defendants, by a
quantum of clear and convincing evidence; 2) it articulated, for the first time, a
substantive insanity test, adopting a more restrictive version of MNaghlen,
thus discarding the ALI-Model Penal Code test previously in place in all fed-
eral circuits; 62 3) it established strict procedures for the hospitalization and
release of defendants found NGRI and incompetent to stand trial; and 4) it
severely limited the scope of expert testimony in insanity cases. 63
Similarly, States responded in a similar manner."' Seventy-five percent of
all states made some sort of substantive change in insanity defense in the
1978-85 period. In fifteen of sixteen states that changed post-acquittal proce-
dures, commitment terms were lengthened, court supervision was tightened,
or the burden of proof was altered - by shifting the burden from state to de-
55. Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The .Symbolism Mythology of Insanity Defense juripru-
dence, 40 CASlI W. Rtis. L. RiEv. 599, 613-14 (1989-90).
56. Peter Arenella, Reflections on Current Proposals to Aboish or Reform the Insaniy Defense, 8
AM.J.L. & MED. 271, 272 (1982).
57. 18 U.S.C. § 17(a) (1984).
58. 2 PIRuN, supra note 5, at 340.
59. Perlin, supra note 55, at 614 n. 65.
60. Perlin, supra note 52, at 1382.
61. See Michael L. Perlin, "The Things We Do For Love": John Hinckls Trial and the Future of
the Insanity Defense in the Federal Courts (Book Review), 30 N.Y.L. SCH. L. Riv. 857, 862 (1985); 2
PERIuN, supra note 5, at 149-54 for a full discussion of the MNaghten case.
62. PLIRuN, supra note 5, at 160-63.
63. Perlin, supra note 55, at 638-39 nn. 172-77. On how these changes were made without
the benefit of any substantiating empirical evidence, see generally Carmen Cirincione & Charles
Jacobs, Identifing Insanity Acquittals: Is It Any Eader?, 23 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 487 (1999).
64. See generaly Lisa Callahan et al., Insanity Defense Reform in the United States-Post-Hinckley,
11 MENTAL & PHYS. DISABluTY L. REiP. 54 (1987).
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fendant and/or reducing the quantum of proof from "beyond a reasonable
doubt" to "preponderance of the evidence" or "clear and convincing evi-
dence." In six of eight states that changed the substantive test, the definition
was restricted [either by changing from the ALI-Model Penal Code test or
M'Naghten plus irresistible impulse to M'Naghten, or by restricting insanity de-
fense testimony to mens rea evidence]. 65 In twelve jurisdictions, a Guilty But
Mentally Ill ("GBMI") verdict 66 was added.67
In four states, the defense has been abolished.68 Interestingly, where the
insanity defense has been abolished, there is often a statistically significant
increase in the number of defendants found permanently incompetent to
stand trial.69
In short, the insanity defense - never an attractive option for a criminal
defendant70 - has become far less attractive in the past thirty years. Inevitably,
65. In Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 747 (2006), the Supreme Court rejected a constitu-
tional challenge to an Arizona law, ruling that it was not a due process violation for a state to
"narrow[n its insanity test or [exclude] evidence of mental illness and incapacity due to mental
illness to rebut evidence of the requisite criminal intent." Commentary on Clark has been
almost wholly negative. See MICHAi. L. PIURLIN & HlATHIR E. CucoL.o, MIFNTAI. DISABILITY
LAW: CIVIL. AND CRIMINALi(2012 CUM. SuPP.), at 81-82 no. 277.94 (citing sources).
66. See 2 PFRLIN, supra note 5, at 169-79. 1 believe that that defense is "superfluous" and
"dangerous," (see Joseph Rodriguez et al., The Insanity Defense Under Siege: Legislative Assaults and
Legal Rejoinders, 14 RUTGERS L.J. 397, 411 (1983)), and "deceptive and hollow[.]" Pi;R.iN, supra
note 21, at 95. Of course, defendants who "successfully" plead GBMI go to prison and usually
have no right to mental health services or treatment beyond that of the "ordinary" prisoner. See
Bradley D. McGraw et al., The "Guily But Mentally Ill" Pka and Verdict: Current State of the
Knowkdge, 30 Viu.. L. Riv. 117, 187 (1985).
67. 2 PliRIIN, supra note 5, at 347 n. 125 (discussing the research in Callahan et al., supra
note 64). Perlin, supra note 52, at 1376-77. See also George L. Blau & Richard A. Pasewark,
Statutory Changes and the Insaniy Defense: Seeking the Perfect Insane Person, 18 LAw & PSYCHOiL. Rkiv.
69(1994).
68. Montana, Idaho, Utah, and Kansas have abolished the insanity defense. See Henry F.
Fradella; From Insanity to Beyond Diminished Capadly: Mental Illness and Criminal Excuse in the Post-
Clark Era, 18 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. PolY 7, 34-35 (2007). See also Cynthia G. Hawkins-Le6n,
"I Aterature as Law'": The History of the Insanity Plea & a FictionalApplication Within the Iaw & I itera-
ture Canon, 72 TiMP. L. Ri~v. 381, 405 (1999).
69. See Rita Buitendorp, A Statuto7y Iesson from "Big Sky County" on Abolshing the Insanit
Defense, 30 VAL. U. L. Riw. 965, 993-96 (1996) (discussing research reported in Henry J. Stead-
man et al., Maintenance of an Insaniy Defense Under Montana's 'Abolition" of the Insaniy Defense, 146
AM.J. PSYCHIATRY 357, 359-60 (1989)).
70. On how jurors' pre-existing "'knowledge structures' . . . strongly influence their case
judgments" in insanity trials, see Jennifer L. Skeem & Stephen L. Golding, Describing jurors'
Personal Conceptions of Insanity and Their Relationship to Case judgments, 7 PSYCHol.. PUB. Poi'Y & L.
561, 561 (2001). On how their attitudes about the defense in se "powerfully influence" their
information processing in their decision making, see Jennifer Eno Louden & Jennifer L. Skeem,
Constructing Insanity:Jurors' Prototypes, Attitudes, and Legal Decision-Making, 25 BF HAV. SCI. & L. 449,
462 (2007). On juror inflexibility in this regard, even after being provided with correct information, see
Jennifer Skeem, Jennifer Eno Louden, & Jennee Evans, Venire Persons' Attitudes Toward the In-
sanity Defense: Developing, Refining, and Validating a Scale, 28 LAW & H uM. BieHAv. 623, 625 (2004).
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this has increased the number of persons with serious mental illness in state
prisons.
2. The Implications of Raising the Defense
One of the prevailing insanity defense myths is that insanity acquittees
"spend much less time in custody than do defendants convicted of the same
offenses."' Contrary to this myth, NGRI acquittees actually spend almost
double the amount of time that defendants convicted of similar charges spend
in prison settings and often face a lifetime of post-release judicial oversight.72
Most importantly for the perspectives of this presentation, the less serious the
offense, the longer the gap is between the amount of time that an insanity
acquittee serveS73 and the amount of time that a convicted defendant serves. A
California study, by way of example, has revealed that those found NGRI of
non-violent crimes were confined for periods over nine times as long.74 Thus, it
makes progressively less sense for a defendant to raise the insanity defense.75
But there is more. Just raising the defense is a high-risk maneuver. De-
fendants who raise the insanity defense and are unsuccessful serve significant-
ly longer sentences than those who did not assert the defense. 76 Also, the Su-
preme Court decision in Shannon v. United States, which held that, as a matter
of federal criminal procedure, the defendant had no right to have the jury
71. PERLIN, supra note 21, at 110. On how the valid and reliable research on the insanity
defense contradicts most of the "commonly-held beliefs" about the defense's usage, see Randy
Borum & Solomon M. Fulero, Empirical Research on the Insanity Defense and Attempted Reforms:
Evidence Toward Informed Poliy, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 375, 378 (1999).
72. Perlin, supra note 55, at 651 (citing empirical results reported in Rodriguez et al., supra
note 66, at 403-04, and Mark Pogrebin et al., Not Guily By Reason of Insanity: A Research Note, 8
INT'I.J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 237, 240 (1986)).
73. 1 use the word "serve" consciously, as invariably, this cohort of defendants is institu-
tionalized in a maximum-security, prison-like setting. See Michael L. Perlin, A Law of Healing 68
U. CIN. L. Riv. 407, 428 (2000).
74. Perlin, sepra note 52, at 1405 (discussing research reported in HENRY STEADMAN ET
AL., REFORMING THE INSANITY DIFENSE: AN ANALYSIS OF PRE- AND POST-HINCKLEY
REFORMS 94 (1993)). A National Mental Health Association report found that as many as 86%
of insanity pleas occur in nonviolent felonies and misdemeanors. See Elizabeth Nevins-
Saunders, Not Guilty As Charged: The Myth of Mens Reafor Defendants with Mental Retardation, 45
U.C. DAVIS L. Riy. 1419, 1454 n. 172 (2012) (discussing NAT'I. MENTAL HEALTH Ass'N,
MYTHS & REALITIEs: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE
20-21 (1983)).
75. See, e.g., Sherin S. Vitro, Promoting Therapeutic Objectives Through LB 518: A Sane Amend-
ment to Nebraska Law Governing the Disposition of Insanity Acquittees, 72 N EB. L. REv. 837, 844
(1993) ("[Ain individual in need of treatment may fail to assert the insanity defense because a
criminal sentence would be of definite and frequently shorter duration.").
76. PERLIN, supra note 21, at 109; Rodriguez et al., supra note 66, at 401-02, 402 n. 32. See
Jeraldine Braff, Thomas Arvinites, & Henry J. Steadman, Detention Patterns of Successfuland Unsnc-
cessfullnsanity Defendants, 21 CIUMINOLOGY 439, 445 (1983) (defendants who raised the insanity
defense and were unsuccessful were incarcerated for 22% longer as compared to those who did
not raise the defense).
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informed about the possible consequences of a not guilty by reason of insani-
ty verdict,77 will likely make it even less likely that the insanity defense will be
employed. Elsewhere, I have characterized this decision as "bizarre."78
Not unimportantly, this state of affairs will likely increase the amount of
pretextuality in decision making in this area of the law.79 In her opinion for
the Court in Pent v. Lnaugh,80 Justice O'Connor argued:
The common law prohibition against punishing "idiots" for
their crimes suggests that it may indeed be "cruel and unusu-
al" punishment to execute persons who are profoundly or se-
verely retarded and wholly lacking the capacity to appreciate
the wrongfulness of their actions. Because of the protections
afforded by the insanity defense today, such a person is not
likely to be convicted or face the prospect of punishment.8 '
I wrote nearly ten years ago that this statement "ignores the post-
Hinckley political reality that the insanity defense has been severely truncated
in many jurisdictions and has been 'abolished' in others," 82 and certainly noth-
ing has happened in the intervening decade to lead me to change my mind on
this point. As with the substantive reduction of the insanity defense and its
procedural tightening discussed above, these factors again, make the insanity
defense an even less attractive option.
3. The Length of Post-acquittal Commitments
In 1983, the Supreme Court ruled, in Jones v. United States,83 that it was
not unconstitutional to retain insanity acquittees for longer periods of time
than the maximum sentence for the underlying crime, 84 finding that there is
no correlation between severity of crime committed and time necessary for
"recovery." 85 The defendant in Jones had been arrested for attempted petty
77. 512 U.S 573 (1994).
78. 2 PERLIN, supra note 5, at 197, 199 (characterizing the decision as either "atypically
naive, meretricious, or simply deceitful").
79. Prextextuality defines the ways in which courts accept (either implicitly or explicitly)
testimonial dishonesty and engage similarly in dishonest (and frequently meretricious) decision-
making. See generally MICHAEL L. PERI.IN, THE HIDDHN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON
TRIAL 1 (2000); Michael L. Perlin, 'Half-Wracked Prejudice Leaped Forth": Sanism, Pretextuality, and
Wh~y and How Mental Disability Law Developed as It Did, 10J. CONTEMP. LEGAL. Issu-s 3 (1999). See
also Perlin, supra note 21, at 428-29 (Shannon "will only increase the amount of pretextuality in
decisionmaking in this area of the law.").
80. 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (rejecting categorical ban on execution of persons with mental
retardation), overruled ly Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). Seegenerall Perlin, Death Disap-
pears, supra note 22.
81. Penry, 492 U.S. at 333.
82. Perlin, Death Disappears, supra note 22, at 324-25.
83. 463 U.S. 370 (1983).
84. Id. at 359.
85. Id. at 369.
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larceny (shoplifting); yet, the Court saw no reason to treat a misdemeanor case
any different from a case involving a murder, rape, or armed robbery. In its
decision, the Court quoted an earlier decision of the District of Columbia
Circuit that had been written by Chief Justice Burger: "Mo describe the theft
of watches and jewelry as 'non-dangerous' is to confuse danger with violence.
Larceny is usually less violent than murder or assault, but in terms of public
policy the purpose of the statute is the same as to both."8 6
Jones was a political decision that permitted indeterminate commitment
and reflected the Supreme Court's "unwillingness to contradict public senti-
ment (soon after the Hinckley acquittal) in such a controversial area."87 "It
further provided the Court with a vehicle to impose its dissatisfaction with the
insanity defense on defendants who succeeded in the use of a plea by making
it even less likely that the plea would be used in the future,"88 "illuminat[ing]
the Court's antipathy toward insanity pleaders."89
B. The Perils of Raising the Incompetency Status
Unlike the insanity defense, which can be raised only by the defendant,
defense counsel, the prosecutor or the judge can raise the question of incom-
petency, if there is a "bona fide doubt" that the defendant is, in fact, compe-
tent to stand trial.90 Although, generally, this is done on application of defense
86. Id. at 365 n. 14.
87. Michael L. Perlin, "For the Misdemeanor Outlaw?: Tbe Impact of the ADA on the Institutional-
iation of Criminal Defendants wth Mental Disabilties, 52 ALABAMA L. Riv. 193, 211-12 (2000)
(quoting, in part, Louise Dovre, Jones v. United States: Automatic Commitment ofIndividuals Found
Not Guilty y Reason of Insaniy, 68 MINN. L. RFv. 822, 840 (1984)). On how decisions such as
Jones "enhance the 'clutchability' of successful insanity defendants," see John La Fond & Mary
Durham, Cognitive Dissonance: Have Insanity Defense and Civil Commitment Reforms Made a Dierence?,
39 Viu.. L. Riv. 71, 104 (1994). On the concept of "clutchability" in general in criminal law, see
e.g., Joel Feinberg, Crime, Clutchabifiy, and Individuated Treatment, in DOING & DISERVING:
ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RFsPONsIBIITY 252 (1970). On the concept in the context of men-
tal health courts, see Chelsea Davis, Therapeutic jurisprudence, Drug Courts, and Mental Health
Courts:, With the Best ofIntentions, 3 J. MENTAL HEALTH L. & POLY (Forthcoming 2013).
88. Perlin, supra note 87, at 212; PERLIN, supra note 21, at 200-01. See also, e.g., Janet
Polstein, Throwing Away the Key: Due Process Rights of Insanity Acquittees in Jones v. United States,
34 AM. U. L. REv. 479, 521 (1985). At least one study found that the post-Hinckley statutory
changes to the insanity defense in multiple states resulted in fewer defendants entering insanity
pleas in those jurisdictions. See HENRY J. STEADMAN ET AL., BEFORE AND ArER HINCKLEY:
EVALUATING INSANITY DEFENSE REFORM 38 (1993) (as discussed in Fradella, supra note 68, at
37-38).
89. Perlin, supra note 87, at 194. For changes in the reduction of the use of the insanity
defense after Hinckley and Jones, see generally, Lisa Callahan, Factors Associated nith the Conditional
Release of Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity: A Decision Tree Approach, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
147 (1998); Lisa Callahan, Connie Meyer & Henry Steadman, The Volume and Characteristics of
Insanity Defense Pkas:An Eight-State Study, 19 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 331 (1991).
90. See, e.g., 4 PERLIN, supra note 5, at 13-14; Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966);
State v. Johnson, 218 P.3d 46, 53 (Kan. 2009); Lynda E. Frost & Adrienne E. Volenik, The
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counsel or by the court, there are isolated jurisdictions in which the district
attorney appears to do this regularly.9' What has become clear now is that the
mere raising of the status can place the defendant at great risk.
First, in spite of the Supreme Court's decisionfory years ago in Jackson v.
Indiana92 that a person charged by a State with a criminal offense who is com-
mitted solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held
"more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether
there is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foresee-
able future," 93 astoundingly, this decision continues to be ignored by half the
states.94 What this means is that individuals who should "fit" under the lan-
guage of Jackson are often kept in maximum-security facilities for far longer
than the three and a half year "cut off" period adopted by the Jackson court. 95
At least one state Supreme Court has specifically sanctioned procedures that
ignore the Jackson holding.96
Ethical Perils of Representing the juvenile Defendant Who May Be Incompetent, 14 WASH. U.J.L. & Poi.'Y
327, 331 (2004).
91. See Michael L. Perlin, 'Too Stubborn To Ever Be Governed By Enforced Insanity": Some Thera-
peutic Jurisprudence Dilemmas in the Representation of Criminal Defendants in Incompeteng and Insanity
Cases, 33 INT'iJ. L. & PSYCHIATRY 475, 480 n. 63 (2010):
When I presented parts of this paper to the American-Psychology Law Society confer-
ence two years ago, I noted that, in my experience, this was done almost exclusively by
defense counsel, and then said jokingly, "except on the TV show Law and Order,
where the District Attorney character seems to raise it remarkably frequently." At this
point, several hands went up, and members of the audience noted their disagreement,
pointing out that in their jurisdiction, incompetency was frequently raised by the D.A. I
asked where they were from, and al were from Hamilton County, Ohio (Cincinnati). I
have yet to hear of this practice being prevalent in any other jurisdiction.
92. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
93. Id. at 738.
94. See Bruce Winick, Restructuring Competeng to Stand Trial, 32 UCLA L. Riv. 921, 941
(1985). See also Ellen C. Wertlieb, Individuals With Disabilities in the CriminalJustice System: A Review
ofthe Literature, 18 CRIM.JUST.& BlHAv. 332, 336 (1991). Winick's research has been updated in
Grant Morris & J. Reid Meloy, Out of Mind? Out of Sight: The Uncivil Commitment of Permanenty
Incompetent Criminal Defendants, 27 U.C. DAvis L. Riiv. 1, 8 (1993) (A decade after Winick pub-
lished his article, Jackson remained "ignored land] circumvented.") See Perlin, supra note 87, at
204 ("[Miore than half the states allow for the indefinite commitment of incompetent-to-stand-
trial defendants, in spite of Jackson's specific language outlawing this practice."). See also generally
Andrew R. Kaufman, Bruce B. Way, & Enrico Suardi, Forty Years After Jackson v. Indiana: States'
Compliance with "Reasonable Period of Time" Ruling, 40 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 261 (2012)
(showing most states out of compliance with Jackson). I discuss the significance of the earlier
findings in Michael L. Perlin, Fatal Assumption: A Critical Evaluation of the Role of Counsel in
Mental Disability Cases, 16 LAW & HUM. BliHAv. 39, 47-48 (1992).
95. See Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738-39 ("We note ... that petitioner Jackson has now been
confined for three and one-half years on a record that sufficiently estabhshes the lack of a sub-
stantial probability that he will ever be able to participate fully in a trial.").
96. See State v. Werner, 796 P.2d 610, 613 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990) (showing it was not error
to treat dangerous patients committed pursuant to Jackson differently from civil patients).
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The mere raising of the incompetency status is often a perilous decision.
There are multiple reasons why an effective and competent defense lawyer
might not even raise the question of incompetency, among them the lack of
availability of bail, the conditions of institutionalization at the referral hospital,
and the possible iatrogenic or ameliorative impact of psychiatric institutionali-
zation on the defendant.97 Josephine Ross has suggested that an "ethic of
care" might call for disregarding incompetency concerns,98 and Christopher
Slobogin and Amy Mashburn underscore that the raise-or-not-raise decision is
necessarily a "nuanced" one.99 In a particularly thoughtful piece, Keri Gould
has argued that the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel may ethically
support the decision to ignore the competency question entirely.'oo This issue
is of special importance in the case of defendants charged with petty offenses
who face little or no jail time if convicted, but who may be institutionalized
for years in maximum security facilities once the status issue is raised.101
This all raises the spectre of what is called the "incredible dilemma:"
What can or should be done when multiple civil, constitutional, or statutory
rights and policies clash?102 Certainly, an outcome of this dilemma is likely to
cause a reduction of the number of cases in which the incompetency status is
raised, thus, increasing the number of defendants with mental disabilities in
jail and prison facilities.
Second, involuntary medication is often the intervention of choice when
restoration of competency to stand trial is sought. The Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Sell v. United States' 03 - holding that although a defendant has a quali-
fied right to refuse to take antipsychotic drugs prescribed solely to render him
competent to stand trial, medication over objection is permissible where the
court finds that treatment is medically appropriate, is substantially unlikely to
have side effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial, and, taking ac-
97. See 2 PERI.IN, supra note 5, at 61. See generaly Paul A. Chernoff & William G. Schaffer,
Defending the Mentally Ilk EthicalQuicksand, 10 AM. CRIM. L. Riw. 505 (1972).
98. Josephine Ross, Autonomy Versus a Client's Best Interests: The Defense Lauyer's Dilemma
When Mental# Ill Cients Seek to ControlTheir Defense, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1343, 1372-81 (1998).
99. Christopher Slobogin & Amy Mashburn, The Criminal Defense Lanyer's FidudaU Duty to
Clients aidth Mental Disabikly, 68 FORDHAM L. Riav. 1581, 1622 (2000).
100. See Keri A. Gould, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis of Competeng Evaluation Requests:
The Defense Attorney's Dilemma, 18 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 83, 91-95 (1995). Gregory Brown,
The Case of]ohn Salvi: Ethical Binds When Representing the Incompetent Defendant, 4 SUFFoIK J. TRIAL
& App. Anvoc. 49, 61 (1999) ("Whatever the motivation for refusing to raise incompetence,
such a refusal on the part of the defendant can put defense counsel in an ethical bind between
the duty to advocate zealously for their client and the duty to raise the issue of competency to
stand trial.").
101. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
102. See Michael L. Perlin, Hospitalized Patients and the Right to Sexual Interaction: Beyond the Last
Frontier? 20 N.Y.U. RiEv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 517, 540 (1993-94) (discussing Peter Westen, Incred-
ible Dilemmas: Conditioning One Constitutional Right on the Forfeiture ofAnother, 66 IowA L. REv. 741,
742 (1981)).
103. 539 U.S. 166 (2003).
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count of less intrusive alternatives, is necessary significantly to further "im-
portant governmental trial-related interests"10" - makes it clear that many de-
fendants will be so medicated as part of the restoration process. 0 5 Few - if
any - areas of mental disability law have been as contentious over the years as
the right to refuse treatment in civil cases,106 an area where "civil treatment-
refusers" are likely to have more rights than do forensic patients. 07 Certainly,
raising the incompetency status, knowing that it brings with it the potential
risk of such involuntary medication becomes a potentially perilous decision
for defense counsel. In short, defendants seeking to avoid the perils of invol-
untary medication might well be better off ignoring the question of their
competency to stand trial.
C. Conclusion
Every change to the insanity defense in the past thirty years, and every
aspect of incompetency-to-stand-trial practice has made it less likely that these
statuses/defenses will be employed in cases of defendants with mental illness
- especially major mental illness - and charged with crime - especially minor
crimes. Astoundingly, to my mind, this factor has never been raised seriously
in the "criminalization" debate.
I turn now to the use of therapeutic jurisprudence as a potential tool of
remediation.
III. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 08
One of the most important legal theoretical developments of the past
two decades has been the creation and dynamic growth of therapeutic juris-
prudence.109 Initially employed in cases involving individuals with mental dis-
104. Id. at 180-81. See general Michael L. Perlin, "And My Best Friend, My Doctor / Won't Even
Say What It Is I've Got": The Role and Signiicance of Counsel in Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 42 SAN
DiEGo L. RiV. 735, 736 (2005).
105. See PERIN & Cucoio, supra note 65, at 18-27, 24-27 n. 369.41-369.58 (discussing
post-Selllitigation).
106. See, e.g., Perlin, supra note 104, at 736 (for over 30 years, the right to refuse treatment
"has been the most contentious issue in the 'turf' battle between what is incorrectly character-
ized as 'law and psychiatry"').
107. See generally 2 PERLIN, supra note 5, at 189-330.
108. This section is largely adapted from Michael L. Perlin, 'Strikingfor the Guardians and
Protectors of the Mind": The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Mental Disabilities and the Future of
GnardianshiP Law, 117 PENN ST. L. Riv. 1159 (2013); Michael L. Perlin, 'John Brown Went Of to
War": Considering Veterans' Courts as Problem-Solving Courts, 3 NovA L. Riv. (forthcoming 2013)
[hereinafter Perlin, Veterans' Courts]; and Michael L. Perlin, "There Are No Trials Inside the Gates of
Eden": Mental Health Courts, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Dignity, and the
Promise of TherapeuticJurisprudence, in COERCIVEI CARE: LAW AND POLICY (Bernadette McSherry &
Ian Freckelton eds. forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter Perlin, Gates ofEden].
109. See generaly, e.g., DAVID B. Wxi.i;R, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDIINCl: THiE LAW AS A
THIERAPIUTIC AGENT 1 (1990); DAVID B. WExili & BRUCE J. WINICK, LAW IN A
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abilities, but subsequently expanded far beyond that narrow area, therapeutic
jurisprudence presents a new model for assessing the impact of case law and
legislation, recognizing that, as a therapeutic agent, the law can have therapeu-
tic or anti-therapeutic consequences.' o The ultimate aim of therapeutic juris-
prudence is to determine whether legal rules, procedures, and lawyer roles can
or should be reshaped to enhance their therapeutic potential while not subor-
dinating due process principles."' There is an inherent tension in this inquiry,
but David Wexler clearly identifies how it must be resolved: "the law's use of
"mental health information to improve therapeutic functioning [cannot] im-
pinge upon justice concerns."112 As I have written elsewhere, "[a]n inquiry
into therapeutic outcomes does not mean that therapeutic concerns 'trump'
civil rights and civil liberties."" 3
Therapeutic jurisprudence "asks us to look at law as it actually impacts
people's lives"114 and focuses on the law's influence on emotional life and
THERAPEUTIC KEY: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 1 (1996);
BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL 1 (2005);
David B. Wexler, Two Decades of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 24 TOURO L. REv. 17 (2008); 2 PERLIN,
supra note 5, at 534-41. Wexler first used the term in a paper he presented to the National Insti-
tute of Mental Health in 1987. See David B. Wexler, Putting Mental Health into Mental Health Ia.w:
TherapeuticJuriprudence, 16 L. & Hum. BEHAv. 27, 27, 32-33 (1992).
110. See Michael L. Perlin, "His Brain Has Been Mismanaged with Great Skill": How WillJurors
Respond to Neumimaging Testimony in Insanity Defense Cases?, 42 AKRON L. REV. 885, 912 (2009); see
Kate Diesfeld & Ian Freckelton, Mental Health law and Therapeutic jurisprudence, in DISPUTES AND
DII.EMMAS IN HEALTH LAW 91 (lan Freckelton & Kate Peterson eds., 2006) (for a transnation-
al perspective).
111. See generally Michael L. Perlin, "You Have Discussed Ipers and Crooks": Sanism in Clinical
Teaching, 9 CLINICAL. L. Rav. 683 (2003); Perlin, supra note 104; Michael L. Perlin, "Everybod Is
Making 1oe/Or Else Expecting Rain": Considering the SexualAutonomy Rights of Persons Institudonal-
iZed Because of Mental Disability in Forensic Hospitals and in Asia, 83 U. WASH. L. REv. 481 (2008)
[hereinafter Perlin, Expecting Rain].
On how therapeutic jurisprudence "might be a redemptive tool in efforts to combat
sanism, as a means of 'strip[ping] bare the law's sanist fagade,"' see Michael L. Perlin, "Baly,
Look Inside Your Mirror": The Legal Profession's Willful and .Sanist Blindness to Lanyers with Mental
Disabilities, 69 U. PITr. L. REV. 589, 591 (2008) (quoting, in part, PERLIN, supra note 78, at 301).
See also Bernard P. Perlmutter, George's Story: Voice and 'Transformation through the Teaching and Prac-
tce of TherapeuticJuriprudence in a Law School ChildAdvocay Cnic, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 561, 599
n. 111 (2005). Ian Freckelton, TherapeuticJurisprudence Misunderstood and Misrepresented: The Price and
Risks of Influence, 30 T.JEFFERSON L. REV. 575, 585-86 (2008).
112. David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Juriprudence and Changing Concepts of Legal Scholarship, 11
BEHAV. Sa. & L. 17, 21 (1993). See also, e.g., David Wexler, Appying the Law Therapeuticaly, 5
APPL. & PREVENT. PSYCHOL. 179 (1996).
113. Perlin, supra note 21, at 412; Michael L. Perlin, "Where the Winds Hit Heagy on the Border-
line": Mental Disability Law, Theog and Practice, Us and Them, 31 LoYoi.A L.A. L. REV. 775, 782
(1998).
114. Bruce J. Winick, Foreword: Therapeutic]urisprudence Perspectives on Dealing With Victims of
Crime, 33 NOVA L. RIW. 535, 535 (2009).
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psychological well-being. 115 It suggests that "law should value psychological
health, should strive to avoid imposing anti-therapeutic consequences when-
ever possible, and when consistent with other values served by law should
attempt to bring about healing and wellness".1 1 6
In recent years, scholars have considered a vast range of topics through a
therapeutic jurisprudence lens, including, but not limited to, all aspects of
mental disability law, domestic relations law, criminal law and procedure, em-
ployment law, gay rights law, and tort law.' 17 As Ian Freckelton has noted, "it
is a tool for gaining a new and distinctive perspective utilizing socio-
psychological insights into the law and its applications."118 It is also part of a
growing comprehensive movement in the law towards establishing more hu-
mane and psychologically optimal ways of handling legal issues collaboratively,
creatively, and respectfully.'19 In its aim to use the law to empower individu-
als, enhance rights, and promote well-being, therapeutic jurisprudence has
been described as "a sea-change in ethical thinking about the role of law . . . a
movement towards a more distinctly relational approach to the practice of law
. . . which emphasises psychological welness over adversarial triumphal-
ism." 20 That is, therapeutic jurisprudence supports an ethic of care.121
115. David B. Wexler, Practicing TherapeuticJuriprudence: Psychological Soft .Sots and Strategies, in
DANIEl. P. STOLI, DAVID B. WF.XER & BRUCIE J. WINICK, PRACTICING THIERAPEUTC
JURISPRUDINCi: LAW AS A HELPING PROFESSION 45 (Stolle et al. eds., 2006).
116. Bruce Winick, A Therapeutic juriprudence Modelfor Civil Commitment, in INVOIuNTARY
DETENTION AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON CiviL
COMMITMENT 23, 26 (Kate Dies feld & Ian Freckelton, eds., 2003).
117. Michael L. Perlin, "J'hings Have Changed": Looking at Non-institutional Mental Disability
Lw 'Through the Sanism Filter, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. Riv. 535, 537 (2002-03).
118. Diesfeld & Freckelton, supra note 110, at 582.
119. Susan Daicoff, The Role of Therapeutic Juriprudence Within The Comprehensive Law Move-
ment, in DANIFl. P. STO.E, DAVID B. Wixi.R, & BRuciJ. WINICK, PRACTICING THFRAPlUTC
JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A HHI.PING PROFESSION 365 (Stole et al. eds., 2006).
120. Warren Brookbanks, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Conceiing an Ethical Framework, 8 J.L. &
MED. 328, 329-30 (2001). See also Bruce J. Winick, Overcoming Psychological Barriers to Settlement:
Challenges for the '1J Lanyer in THiF AFFECTIVE AssIsTANCE OF CouNslo.: PRACTICING LAW AS A
HILING PROF.SSION 342 (Marjorie A. Silver ed., 2007); Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler,
T he Use of Therapeutic jurisprudence in Iow School Clinical Education: Transforming the Criminal Jaw
Clnic, 13 C.INICAL L. REv. 605, 605-06 (2006). The use of the phrase dates to Carol Gilligan's
book, IN A DIFFERENT VoIcE (1982).
121. See, e.g., Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler, The Use of Therapeutic Jurirprudence in Low
School Clinical Education: Transforming the Criminal Law Cnic, 13 CINIcAL L. RlIv. 605, 605-07
(2006); David B. Wexler, Not Such a Party Pooper An Attempt to Accommodate (Many of) Professor
Quinn's Concerns about TherapeuticJuriprudence Criminal Defense Lauyering, 48 B.C. L. REV. 597, 599
(2007); Brookbanks, supra note 120; Gregory Baker, Do You Hear the Knocking at the Door? A
"'Jherapeutic"Approach to Enriching Clinical legalEducation Comes Calling, 28 WHIrTIER L. REv. 379,
385 (2006).
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One of the central principles of therapeutic jurisprudence is a commit-
ment to dignity.122 Professor Amy Ronner describes the "three Vs": voice,
validation and voluntariness, 123 arguing:
What "the three Vs" commend is pretty basic: litigants must
have a sense of voice or a chance to tell their story to a deci-
sion maker. If that litigant feels that the tribunal has genuinely
listened to, heard, and taken seriously the litigant's story, the
litigant feels a sense of validation. When litigants emerge from
a legal proceeding with a sense of voice and validation, they
are more at peace with the outcome. Voice and validation cre-
ate a sense of voluntary participation, one in which the litigant
experiences the proceeding as less coercive. Specifically, the
feeling on the part of litigants that they voluntarily partook in
the very process that engendered the end result or the very
judicial pronunciation that affects their own lives can initiate
healing and bring about improved behavior in the future. In
general, human beings prosper when they feel that they are
making, or at least participating in, their own decisions. 124
The question to be addressed here is this: in light of what I have dis-
cussed in the prior parts of this paper (the data as to the real relationship be-
tween mental illness and criminalization, and the impact of recent insanity
defense and incompetency developments on the "pathways" of persons with
serious mental disabilities charged with crime), to what extent does therapeu-
tic jurisprudence offer us remediating suggestions and/or solutions?
IV. CONTEXTUALIZING CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND MENTAL DISABILITY
What should be clear from the earlier sections of this article is that the
common wisdom is mostly wrong about the relationship between criminaliza-
tion and mental disability. It is wrong in its characterization of how the cur-
rent state of affairs came about, it is wrong in the causal connections it makes,
and it is wrong in its failure to inquire into the ways that changes in criminal
law and procedure must be carefully considered in any investigation of this
issue. This is not to say that there is no connection between criminality and
122. See BRuct J. WINICK, Civil. COMMITMENT: A THE;RAPHUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODI.L
161 (2005).
123. Amy D. Ronner, The Learned-Helpless Lanyer Cnical Legal Education and Therapeutic
Juripurdence as Antidotes to Barlely Syndrome, 24 TOURO L. REV. 601, 627 (2008). On the im-
portance of "voice," see also Diesfeld & Freckelton, supra note 110, at 588.
124. Amy D. Ronner, Songs of Validation, Voice, and Voluntag Participation: TherapeuticJurispru-
dence, Miranda and Juveniles, 71 U. CIN. L. REv. 89, 94-95 (2002). See general# AMY D. RONNER,
LAW, LITERATURE AND THERAPEUTICJURISPRUDENCE 1 (2010).
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mental disability at all,125 but that the connection is a modest one and one that
applies only to a small subgroup of the relevant population. 126
Researchers such as Jennifer Skeem and her associates have done a her-
culean job of pointing this out, but sadly much of their work - all validated, all
reliable - has fallen on deaf ears, perhaps because it is, in so many ways, dis-
sonant with our warped "ordinary common sense [OCS]."27 Writing recently
about the impact of this false OCS on our insanity defense jurisprudence, I
said this:
Reliance on OCS is one of the keys to an understanding of
why and how, by way of example, insanity defense jurispru-
dence has developed. Not only is it pre-reflexive and self-
evident, it is also susceptible to precisely the type of idiosyn-
cratic, reactive decision making that has traditionally typified
insanity defense legislation and litigation. 128
125. See Skeem, supra note 42, at 117-18 (emphasis added).
126. See id. at 118 (discussing the research reported on in Jillian Peterson et al, -Ana#ying
Offense Patterns as a Function of Mental Illness to Test the Criminali.ation Hypothesis, 61 PSYCHIATRIC
SERv. 1217, 1220 (2010) (only 7% of persons with mental illness "clearly fit the criminalization
hypothesis")).
127. See MICHAFI. L. PERLIN, A PRFSCRIPTION FOR DIGNITY: RE.THINKING CRIMINAL
JUSTICE AND MENTAL. DISABILITY LAW (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 31) (on file with
author) (citations omitted):
"Ordinary common sense" (OCS) is a "powerful unconscious animator of legal deci-
sion making." It is a psychological construct that reflects the level of the disparity be-
tween perception and reality that regularly pervades the judiciary in deciding cases in-
volving individuals with mental disabilities. OCS is self-referential and non-reflective: "I
see it that way, therefore everyone sees it that way; I see it that way, therefore that's the
way it is." It is supported by our reliance on a series of heuristics-cognitive-simplifying
devices that distort our abilities to consider information rationally.
128. Id. at 32. On the role of false OCS in the perpetuation of false beliefs in police and
criminal psychology, see Michael G. Aamodt, Reducing Misconceptions and False Beliefs in Police and
CriminalPycholog, 35 CRIM.JUST. & BFHAv. 1231 (2008) (discussing the role of false OCS in the
perpetuation of false beliefs in police and criminal psychology). See also Lurigio, supra note 36, at
11; David Flagel & Paul Gendreau, Sense, Common Sense, and Nonsense, 35 CRIM.JUST. & BHAV.
1354 (2008) (discussing the relationship between such OCS and attitudes towards law enforce-
ment in general); Louden & Skeem, supra note 70, at 465-66 (discussing the role of OCS with
regard to juror's false belief about the insanity defense); Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Courts, the
NAS, and the Future of Forensic Sdence, 75 BROOK. L. Riv. 1209, 1209 (2010) (demonstrating this
phenomenon through relating a story about a conversation she had with her seatmate on a
recent airline flight):
On a recent flight, the person next to me on the crowded airplane began to chat with
me. When I told her about what I researched and studied, she looked at me with a big
grin. "I LOVE forensic science," she said. "I watch CSI whenever I can. They can do
such amazing things. It's all so high tech-and incredibly accurate! It's almost like mag-
ic, isn't it?" She leaned in a bit closer and looked at me intently. "Tell me, is it like that
in real life?"
I looked at her for a moment before answering. I felt a bit like the older child on the
playground about to reveal to her younger friend that Santa Clause doesn't really exist.
I shook my head. "No, I wouldn't say that CSI's depiction is entirely realistic. In the re-
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Certainly, this is a major culprit in the area of law and social policy under
discussion here.
Consider, then, the potential application of therapeutic jurisprudence to
this state of affairs. In doing this, it is necessary to consider all of this in the
specific context of mental health courts.129 Briefly, mental health courts - one
form of "problem-solving courts"o30 - follow the legal theory of therapeutic
jurisprudence, in an attempt "to improve justice by considering the therapeu-
tic and anti-therapeutic consequences that flow from substantive rules, legal
procedures, or the behavior of legal actors."131 They are designed to deal ho-
listicallyl32 with people arrested (usually, but not exclusively, for nonviolent
misdemeanors)'3 3 when mental illness, rather than criminality, appears to be
al world, forensic science isn't nearly so glossy. It isn't nearly so speedy. And most im-
portant, it isn't nearly so foolproof, either."
"Really? That's too bad," she told me. She looked at me directly for a brief moment,
shook her head, and then looked away. "Well, to tell you the truth, I think I'd rather
just keep believing in the television version." Figuring that reality was not going to be
any match for CSI, I shrugged, and went back to the book I was reading.)
Id.
129. See generally Perlin, Gates of Eden, supra note 107; Michael L. Perlin, 'The judge, He Cast
His Robe Aside": Mental Health Courts, Dignity and Due Process, 3 J. MENT. HEALTH L. & Poi,'y
(forthcoming 2013).
130. Problem-solving courts grew out of an interdisciplinary approach to address the un-
derlying problem, not just the symptoms, of "substance abuse, domestic violence, child abuse,
mental illness, and certain kinds of criminality." See generally Bruce J. Winick, TherapeuticJurispru-
dence and Problem Solving Courts, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1055, 1060 (2003). For overviews, see
generally Michael Dorf & Jeffrey Fagan, Problem- Solving Courts: From Innovation to Institutionaliga-
tion, 40 AM. CRIM. L. RFv. 1501 (2003) (providing an overview of problem-solving courts). See
also Jeffrey Fagan & Victoria Malkin, T1heoriring Community justice through Community Courts, 30
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 897-98 (2003).
131. Nancy Wolff, Courts as Therapeutic Agents: 'Thinking Past the Novely ofMental Health Courts,
30 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 431, 431 (2002). See also Randal Fritzler, How One Misdemeanor
Mental Health Court Incorporates Therapeutic jurisprudence, Preventive Law, and Restorative justice, in
MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE: POLICY, PRACTICE,
ADMINISTRATION 14-1, 14-3 (Jacqueline Moore ed., 2003) ("Tihe fundamental principle under-
lying therapeutic jurisprudence is the selection of options that promote health and are con-
sistent with the values of the legal system.").
132. Shauhin Talesh, Mental Health Court judges as Dynamic Risk Managers: A New Conceptual-
ikation of the Role ofjudges, 57 DEPAut L. REV. 93,112 (2007).
133. See Johnston, supra note 50, at 521 (discussing the trend towards the expansion of
predicate case jurisdiction to include felonies, include violent felonies). See, e.g., Andrew
Wasicek, Mental Illness and Crime: Envisioning a Public Health Strategy and Reimaging Mental Health
Courts, 48 CRIM. L. BuLl.. 106, 135 (2012):
Mental health courts should accept violent felonies because it is morally unsound to
punish criminal behavior that is mainly a product of mental disease. With appropriate
eligibility criteria, the new mental health court model would encapsulate persons who
are not shielded by the insanity defense - especially persons from post-Jones v. U.S.,
463 U.S. 354 (1983) ... Japproving stringent statutory measures governing releases of
persons found not guilty by reason of insanity, see 4 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL
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the precipitating reason for the behavior in question. 134 The mental health
court judge 35 seeks to divert the individual from the criminal court in ex-
change for an agreement to participate in community treatment, 136 and to
"help participants avoid future criminal court involvement." 37
What impact does this have on the question at hand? Judge Ginger Ler-
ner Wren is explicit: "The innovation of mental health courts was a direct
judicial response to the trend known as the 'criminalization of the mentally
il."'138 I agree with the late Professor Bruce Winick that, in this specific con-
text, problem-solving courts and therapeutic jurisprudence "can do much to
transform laiv into an instrument of healing for both the individual and the
community,"' 39 and with Janet York and her colleagues that "therapeutic ju-
risprudence in the court system reduces stigmatization of addicts and shifts
the court's focus from criminalization . . . to treatment."'4 The therapeutic
jurisprudence-basis of mental health courts is a perfect antidote to so much of
both the actual criminalization of persons with mental illness and the criminal-
ization "debate." One of the great values of the "Memphis program" dis-
cussed earlier is how it has "resulted in reduced injuries and arrests and in-
DISABILITY LAW: CIvil. AND CRIMINAi-, at 290-98 (2d ed. 2002)] . .. era - but should
still be held blameless.
134. See generally Susan Stefan & Bruce Winick, A Dialogue on Mental Health Courts, 11
PsYCHol.. PUB. Po.'Y & L. 507, 511 (2005). See also generally Fritzler, supra note 131; Arthur
Lurigio et al., TherapeuticJuriprudence in Action: SAedalized Courts for the Mentally Il, 84 JUDICATURE
184, 186 (2001); John Petrila et al., Prelminay Observations from an Evaluation of the Broward County
Mental Health Court, 37 CT. Riiv. 14, 14 (2002); Ian Freckelton, Mental Health Review Tribunal
Decision-making: A TherapeuticJurisprudence Lens, 10 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 44, 55-56 (2003).
135. Julie B. Raines& Glenn T. Laws, Mental Health Court Survey, 45 CRIM. L. Buu.. 627,632
(2009) ("Judges are the most common referral source of participants into diversion programs
(100% of survey respondents), with mental health personnel (93% of respondents) coming in
second, and attorneys (90% of respondents) coming in a close third. For those agencies that
chose the "other" category, they indicated that referrals could come from families, service
providers, law enforcement personnel, community agencies, and parole officers.").
136. Marjorie A. Silver, layering and Its Discontents: Reclaiming Meaning in the Practice of Iaw,
19 TouRo L. Riv. 773, 803 (2004). See also Talesh, supra note 132, at 110; Camille Nelson,
Radaliting Disability, Disabling Race: Policing Race and Mental Status, 15 BFRKILE .1J. CRIM. L. 1, 2
(2010) (on the necessity of diversion); John Cummings, The Cost ofCraUy: How Therapeutic Juris-
prudence and Mental Health Courts I ower Incarceration Costs, Reduce Reddivism, and Improve Public Safety,
56 Loy. L. Ruv. 279, 306 (2010) (discussing mental health courts' "palpable results"). On the
question of whether this diversion is swifter than traditional court processing, see Allison
Redlich et al., Is Diversion Smift: Comparing Mental Health Court and T raditional CriminalJustice Pro-
cessing, 39 CRIM.JUST. & BliAV 1, 2-3 (2012) (although diversion may not be swifter than tradi-
tional court processing, that may be less important than the fact of diversion itself).
137. Kirk Kimber, Menial Health Courts - Idaho's Best Kept Secret, 45 IDAHO L. Ri-v. 249, 270
(2008). See also Brenda Desmond & Paul Lenz, Mental Health Courts: An Effective Way of Treating
Offenders with Serious MentalIllness, 34 MHNTAIL & PHYSICAL DISABLI.[TY L. RiuP. 525, 526 (2010).
138. Wren, supra note 51, at 586.
139. Winick, supra note 130, at 1090.
140. Janet York et al., Famil Drug Treatment Courts and Social Determinants of Health, 50 FAM.
CT. Ruv. 137, 141 (2012).
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creased diversion of mentally ill individuals into treatment programs.141 There
is a robust literature describing diversion programs that have "worked," mean-
ing that the individuals involved have been afforded treatment and been able
to avoid all of the negative consequences of prison incarceration.142 Such pro-
grams clearly reflect the tenets of therapeutic jurisprudence.
Also, in such programs, the individual subject to the court proceeding is
far more likely to feel that he has a "voice." Recall Professor Ronner's "three
V's" - voice, voluntariness and validation 43 - and consider them in the con-
text of the research that has been done about the Broward County Mental
Health Court. That research tells us that defendants who appear in that court
report a higher score on a "dignity" scale (and a lower score on a "perceived
coercion" scale)144 than any group of criminal defendants who have ever been
studied.145 In short, the actual, real life experiences of the litigants in cases
before judge Wren - the presiding judge of the Broward Court 46
demonstrates that at least one mental health court can be a non-coercive, dig-
nified experience that provides procedural justice and therapeutic jurispru-
dence to those before it.147
We also must consider the question of the adequacy of counsel appoint-
ed to represent the defendants who are the subject of consideration here. 148
What about counsel? I have written often about the scandalous lack of effec-
tive counsel made available to persons with mental disabilities in the civil
141. Calloway, supra note 37, at 359 n. 77.
142. See SLATE& JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 196-200 (discussing programs).
143. See Ronner, supra note 123, at 627.
144. See Bruce Winick, A Therapeutic jurisprudence Approach to Dealing with Coercion in the Mental
Health System, 15 PSYCHIATRY, PsYCHOL. & L. 25 (2008) (discussing the role of therapeutic
jurisprudence in dealing with coercion in the mental health court process).
145. See Norman G. Poythress et al., Perceived Coerdon and Procedural justice in the Broward
Mental Health Court, 25 INT'ILJ.L. & PSYCHIATRY 517, 529-30 (2002).
146. See Wren, supra note 51, at 589.
147. SeeJudith Kaye, Lecture, 81 ST. JOHN'S L. Rtv. 743, 748 (2007) ("[Miental health courts,
which ... divert defendants from jail to treatment, reconnect them, where possible, with family
and friends who care whether they live or die . . . and restore their greatest loss--their sense of
human dignity."); Hafemeister, supra note 47, at 201-02 ("[Pirocedural justice is a key to the
success of mental health courts."). Judge Wren's is not the only court to reflect these
dignitarian values. See also Matthew J. D'Ernic, The Promise of Mental Health Courts, 22 CluM.
JUST. 24 (2007) (discussing other courts besides Broward County mental health Court which
reflect these dignitarian values); PHIRLIN, supra note 127, at 63-78 (discussing mental health
courts).
On the important related issue of the impact of such courts on racial and ethnic mi-
norities, see Robert V. Wolf, Race, Bias, and Problem-Solving Courts, 21 NAT'. BLACK L.J. 27, 46-
47 (2009) (research by National Center for State Courts reveals that African-Americans and
Latinos show more support for practices and procedures promoted by problem-solving courts
than do whites). On the impact of such courts on immigrants, see generally Alina Das, Immi-
grants and Problem-Solving Courts, 33 Cu.JusT. REv. 308 (2008).
148. See general# PERLIN, supra note 127.
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commitment and criminal justice processes. 149 What is the quality of counsel
available to litigants in mental health courts?
Dr. Steven Erickson and his colleagues have expressed concern "as to
whether defendants in mental health courts receive adequate representation by
their attorneys."s 0 Terry Carney characterizes the assumption that adequate
counsel will be present at hearings to guarantee liberty values as a "false
hope."1'5
Henry Dlugacz and Christopher Wimmer summarize the salient issues:
It is not reasonable to expect a client to repose trust in an at-
torney unless she is confident that he is acting in accordance
with her wishes. The client with mental illness may already
doubt the attorney's loyalty. This risk is exacerbated when the
attorney is appointed by the court. The client may wonder
whether the attorney has been assigned in order to zealously
represent her, or instead to facilitate her processing through
the legal system . . . . There are thus strong personal disincen-
tives to thorough preparation, even for the committed attor-
ney .... There are also institutional pressures: The attorney
who depends on the goodwill of others in the system (e.g.,judges, state attorneys, or prosecutors) may pull his punches,
even unwittingly, in order to retain credibility for future inter-
actions (which he would put to use for his future clients).
Judges want cases resolved.15 2
Some solutions have been offered. Bruce Winick as argued that "lawyers
should adequately counsel their clients about the advantages and disad-
vantages of accepting diversion to mental health court . . .. As a result, judges
and defense counsel in mental health courts should ensure that defendants
149. See Michael L. Perlin, '7 Might Need a Good lanyer, Could Be Your Funeral, My 7rial"- A
Global Perspective on the Right to Counsel in Civil Commitment Cases, and Its Implications for Clinical Legal
Education, 28 WAsH. U. J. L. & SOC'. PolY 241, 241 (2008) ("If there has been any constant in
modern mental disability law in its thirty-five-year history, it is the near-universal reality that
counsel assigned to represent individuals at involuntary civil commitment cases is likely to be
ineffective."); Michael L. Perlin, "'The Executioner's Face Is Alays Well-Hidden": The Role of Counsel
and the Courts in Determining Who Dies, 41 N.Y.L. ScH. L. Riw. 201, 207-08 (1996) ("Nearly twen-
ty years ago, when surveying the availability of counsel to mentally disabled litigants, President
Carter's Commission on Mental Health noted the frequently substandard level of representa-
tion made available to mentally disabled criminal defendants. Nothing that has happened in the
past two decades has been a palliative for this problem."). See generally MICHAll L. PFRiAIN,
MI;N'TAi. DISABIIITY AND THE DEATH PlNAITY: THE SHAME OF THE CRIMINAL. JUSTICE
SysTIM 123-39 (2013).
150. Steven Erickson et al, Variations in Mental Health Courts: Challenges, Opportunities, and a
Callfor Caution, 42 COMM. MIENTAI. HIAITHJ. 335, 340 (2006).
151. Terry Carney, The Mental Health Service Crisis of Neoberalism - An Antipodean Perspective,
31 INT'I.J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 101, 111 (2008).
152. Henry A. Dlugac2 & Christopher Wimmer, The Ethics of Representing Clients with Limited
Competeng in Guardianship Proceedings, 4 ST. Louis U.J. HFALTH L. & Pot'y 331, 353-54 (2011).
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receive dignity and respect, are given a sense of voice and validation."153 Turn-
ing to the legal education clinical context, David Wexler has suggested that
students might "consider the kind of dialogue a lawyer might have with a cli-
ent about the pros and cons of opting into a [drug treatment court] or mental
health court." 54 It is essential that counsel has "a background in mental health
issues and in communicating with individuals who may be in crisis." 5 5
One of the critical functions of counsel is to "protect the dignity and au-
tonomy of a person on trial." 5 6 Fair process norms such as the right to coun-
sel "operate as substantive and procedural restraints on state power to ensure
that the individual suspect is treated with dignity and respect" 157 Recently, in
an article about the significance of trained counsel in efforts to effectuate so-
cial change in nations with developing economies in Asia, I said this: "There is
no question that one of the most critical aspects of law reform is the presence
of dedicated and knowledgeable counsel. Without the assignment of such
counsel, meaningful and ameliorative change is almost impossible to
achieve."'5 8
I believe that precisely the same argument can be made with regard to
the issues under discussion here.
Also, consider here the role of judges.159 Judge Michael King has written
eloquently about the need for judges to become experts in the interpersonal
aspects of judging, noting that, depending on the circumstances, judging may
require "particular listening and communication skills, the expression of em-
pathy, the use of techniques of persuasion or motivational interviewing, the
use of techniques to settle child witnesses and collaborative problem-solving
153. Stefan & Winick, supra note 134, at 510-11, 520 (comments by Professor Winick).
154. David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Juriprudence and the Rehabilitative Role of the Criminal Defense
Lauyer, 17 ST. THOMAs L. Rvv. 743, 750 (2005). On dialogues that defense lawyers might have
with their clients in incompetency status or insanity defense cases, see Perlin, supra note 90.
155. Tammy Seltzer, A Misguided Attempt to Address the Criminal justice System's Unfair Treat-
ment of People with MentalIllness, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. Pot'Y & L. 570, 576 (2005). See also M. Car-
mela Epright, Coercing Future Freedom: Consent and Capacities for Autonomous Choice, 38 J.L. Mi1D'. &
ETHICs 799, 801 (2010) ("Ideally, in mental health courts all courtroom personnel (i.e., judge,
prosecutor, defense counsel and other relevant professionals) have experience and training in
mental health issues and available community resources.").
156. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 759 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also, e.g., Philip
Halpern, Government Intrusion into the Attorney-Cent Relationship: An Interest Anaysis of Rights and
Remedies, 32 BuFF. L. Rinv. 127, 172 (1983) ("The right to counsel embraces two separateinter-
ests: reliable and fair determinations in criminal proceedings, and treatment of defendants with
dignity and respect regardless of the effect on the outcome of criminal proceedings.").
157. Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger Courts'
Competing Ideologies, 72 Gio. L.J. 185, 200 (1983).
158. Michael L. Perlin, Online Distance Lgal Education as an Agent of Social Change, 24 PAC.
McGHORGU GLOBAL Bus. & DLv. L.J. 95, 104 (2011).
159. See Perlin, Veterans' Courts, supra note 108.
370
Wisdom is Thrown into jail
techniques."1 60 Certainly, the need for these skills is intensified in cases involv-
ing the population in question.
In discussing the question of the link between mental illness and criminal
behavior, Professor Jennifer Skeem and her colleagues recommended three
policy priorities: (1) identifying offenders for whom mental illness directly
causes criminal behavior; (2) identifying "evidence-based corrections," includ-
ing, isolating "the ingredients of existing programs that reduce recidivism;"
and (3) assessing and addressing system bias, whether this bias is "motivated
by fear or paternalism." 61 I believe all three of these are important goals that
we should seek to implement. Her third goal - the focus on bias, partially
motivated by fear - is at the core of the sanist and pretextual behavior that
controls the entire mental health system, especially when mental health and
criminal justice issues are intertwined. 162 I believe that, until we face this issue,
our efforts at remediation are doomed to failure. However, if we do - as I
think we must - use therapeutic jurisprudence as a mechanism to "expose
pretextuality and strip bare the law's sanist fagade,"l 63 I believe then, and only
then, will we be able to make authentic ameliorative change.
My title, again, comes from Bob Dylan's underappreciated song, Political
World. The lines that immediately follow the one that I use in the title are the-
se:
It [referring to wisdom] rots in a cell, is misguided as hell
Leaving no one to pick up a trail. 164
The world that Dylan describes in this song is, per Oliver Trager, a "cold
and incomprehensible place."1 65 So is a prison stay for so many persons with
mental disabilities. It is time we, again, with a nod to a different Dylan song,
"strike another match [and] go start anew;"1 66 it is the least that we can do.
160. Michael S. King, Realising the Potentialoffudging, 37 MONASH L. Ruiv. 171, 172 (2011).
161. Skeem et al., supra note 42, at 120-22.
162. Sanism is an irrational prejudice of the same quality and character of other irrational
prejudices that cause, and are reflected in, prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexism, homo-
phobia, and ethnic bigotry. It permeates mental disability law, affecting all participants in the
mental disability law system: litigants, fact-finders, counsel, and expert and lay witnesses. Its
corrosive effects have warped mental disability law jurisprudence. See, e.g., Perlin, Expecting Rain,
supra note 111, at 487, 506. See generaly PiERIN, supra note 78. On pretextuality, see generally,
supra note 79.
163. Perlin, supra note 117, at 544; Michael L. Perlin, 'They Keep ItAll Hid:": Th e Ghettoization
of Mental Disability Law and Its Implications for Legal Education, 54 ST. Louis U. L. J. 857, 875
(2010).
164. Bob Dylan, Political Vorld, on OH MERCY (Sony Music Entertainment Inc. 1989).
165. TRAGER, supra note 25, at 493.
166. Bob Dylan,It's All Over Now, Balv Blue, on BRINGING IT Ai.i BACK HOME (Sony Music
Entertainment Inc. 1965).
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